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Abstract 
Large-scale programs developed by government entities have a reputation for both costing more and delivering less than was 
originally intended.  In recognition of that, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) began in 2003 to develop and present 
to Congress a series of status reports and cost audits of selected large acquisitions programs, including data showing changes in 
projected cost, the development schedule, and the number of units to be acquired. This data represents a publicly-available source 
of information on how the value of government programs can change over time; a preliminary model was developed for this 
study that uses GAO data to assess that change in value.  Current findings using this technique are expressed in terms of 
projected program-end net present value (NPV), percentage change in NPV, and an aggregate daily estimated change in NPV 
over all programs.  All results reveal a skew towards loss in value; less than 20% of programs in the set show a positive projected 
net present value, but those programs comprise less than 2% of the aggregate NPV.  When scaled to the FY2012 acquisitions 
budget, the aggregate daily loss over DoD programs is approximately $208 million.  Work to improve and extend these findings 
using more detailed public-domain data is ongoing at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. 
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1. Introduction 
Current assessments of Department of Defence (DoD) acquisitions programs consider changes in costs and 
projected expenditures separately from changes in schedule and quantity to be acquired.  With value modelling [1], 
it becomes possible to consider these changes simultaneously.  A combined analysis should be strongly preferred; a 
program with static costs but a significant decrease in the quantity to be acquired may be of concern even if cost 
overruns are not evident, and overruns in production budgets are far more reasonable if the quantity to be produced 
is significantly increased.  Viewing these metrics together provides a more realistic picture of the overall health of 
an ongoing acquisitions program.  This study is intended to develop and present a simplified preliminary model that 
demonstrates the application of value-centric thought to program analysis.  The value-based methodology presented 
in this paper provides systems engineers with an objective means of comparing and evaluating the economic 
performance of large scale defence and aerospace systems. Interest in value models and value-centric thinking has 
grown since the 1990s [2] [3].  This paper seeks to apply value centric thinking to the evaluation of DoD acquisition 
programs. 
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The primary data source for this document is a set of reports from the Government Accountability Office ( [4] 
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]). For a large set of programs currently in acquisition, these reports show an initial 
(base) cost and schedule estimate as well as a current estimate developed as an ongoing audit.  Data pulled from the 
GAO study for the base estimate consisted of separated budgets for development and production, the expected 
length of the acquisition cycle, and the number of units to be acquired.  Table 1 shows the variable nomenclature 
used for these data points. Data from the current estimate is denoted with a prime (as shown); this convention will 
be continued for any calculations that use data from the current estimate.  Calculations of present value based on the 
undiscounted expenditures in the GAO report require additional information.  To perform these calculations, 
normalized data from detailed year-on-year DoD budgets was analysed. This analysis of expenditures involves the 
estimation of present value, denoted . For example, the present value of base development expenditures is shown 
as , while the present value of current production expenditures is shown as .  It should be noted that no 
funds have been expended at the base estimate;  at .  
Table 1: Data Variables 
Data Point Base Current 
R&D Expenditures   
Production Expenditures   
Length of Acquisition Cycle   
Quantity Acquired   
R&D Funds to be expended   
Production Funds to be expended   
1.1. Perceived Value 
Data in the GAO reports provide undiscounted total expenditures to date.  To estimate the present value of those 
expenditures, the concept of a cost centroid is presented. In general, the intent is to find the point in time at which 
the undiscounted costs ( ) can be discounted as a group and equal the present value ( ) of the cash flow 
as shown in Equation 1, using discounting rate  such that .  In this document,  is referred to as the time 
centroid of cost, since the derivation of that value is strikingly similar to the centroid equation in basic physics 
(Equation 2). 
 
  
 (1) 
 (2) 
  
Given a set of data in which similar categories of cost are provided in a usable form (either as a table of time-
delineated expenditures or as an ordered pair of discounted and undiscounted costs), an average time centroid of 
cost can be calculated and applied to estimate the total discounted cost of undiscounted expenditures. In this 
document we present an analysis that compares the perceived value of a system under DoD acquisition to the costs 
of developing and producing that system.  Figure 1 on the following page presents a visual aid to this discussion; 
due to the inclusion of cost discounting in the analysis the diagram is not to scale.  Three core propositions are used 
to develop the concept of perceived value for this analysis: 
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1. Every decision made to initiate or affect a program will choose the alternative with the highest net value, as
seen from the point of view of the acquisition organization making the decision.  The parallels the concept of 
profit maximization in the microeconomic theory of the firm [6], with net value taking on the role of profit.  
The basis for both profit maximization and net value maximization is an interpretation of rational behaviour
(whether of a person, group, or organization) in which actions are selected in order to achieve preferred 
outcomes [14], [2].  It is helpful to think of net present value as a measure of preference [2], such that an 
outcome with higher net present value is preferred to an outcome with a lower net present value.  We posit 
that perceived value ( ) is constructed in a way that allows net present value (the time-discounted aggregation 
of perceived value and cost) to be such a measure, and define perceived value as the result of such a
construction.
2. Doing nothing is assigned a perceived value of zero and a cost of zero.  Since value scales are unique up to
affine transformations [7], this assignment is always possible, and anchors the perceived value scale.  Net 
value maximization therefore implies that a program is cancelled at the point when the time-discounted sum of 
the aggregation of future perceived value and cost first become negative, because zero net value is greater than 
any negative net value.  This condition also implies that production of a weapon system ceases when the next 
unit to be produced would have a negative net present value, including its perceived value and manufacturing 
cost.
3. When a series of identical weapon systems are manufactured, the marginal perceived value of units decreases
from a maximum observed at the first unit.  This is because weapon systems are, in the microeconomic sense,
input factors to the production of national defence, and conditional factor demand functions always decrease
with factor quantity [6]. 
1.2. Ground rules and assumptions
The time allocated for the research and development of any program ( ) is assumed to end at one-half the total 
time of any acquisitions timeline, either base or current (Equation 3).  It is understood that the relative lengths of 
development and acquisitions timelines vary greatly based on a number of factors; without information about those
factors and the relative importance of each, no more accurate estimate can be made.   The discounted total perceived 
value of the system ( ) at the base estimate is assumed to be exactly equal to the discounted values of 
development and production costs (Equation 4) although it is reasonable to expect a perceived value higher than
the cost of acquisition, no data is available from the selected sources to indicate a more appropriate value.  This
assumption provides a lower bound for the aggregate loss of value for a given program.
(3)
)4
Figure 1: Cost/Value Diagram
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It would not be logical to produce units for which the marginal cost of production exceeds the marginal value of 
the unit; it is assumed that the final unit produced has value  equal to the marginal cost of production 
(Equation 5).  This requires a further assumption that the marginal cost of production remains static over the 
acquisition cycle.  Having fixed the minimum value, it is assumed that the perceived value of any prior item 
increases at a constant rate  from that minimum value (Equation 6); this is a first-order estimate of marginal value 
but is sufficient to provide preliminary results.  Production of units is assumed to be serial and occur at constant time 
intervals of  (E); while learning curves and (especially) the production environment can affect the rate at which 
units are produced, no detailed data is available from the selected sources to provide insight into those effects. The 
sole use of the unit production rate assumption is to apportion value from produced units; improvements to the 
production rate over time would be inconsistent with the assumption of marginal value linearity.  
 
 (5) 
 (6) 
 (7) 
 
Finally, it is assumed that changes in net present value are directly and linearly proportional to the amount of 
money expended (Equation 8).  It is the simplest method available for projecting the effect of current changes into 
the future, and represents an initial estimate rather than a detailed analysis.  In keeping with convention12, we take 
the discounting rate to be 7% (Equation 9). 
 
 (8) 
 (9) 
2. Method 
2.1. Time Centroid of Cost 
The primary source provides estimates of undiscounted expenditures for DoD programs in acquisitions.  To 
accurately assess the actual value of those expenditures, a technique was developed to estimate the present value of 
estimated development and production costs.  Using the definition of the time centroid of cost in Equation 1, the 
centroids for both development and production costs could be directly calculated for a number of DoD acquisitions 
programs similar in size and scope to the programs in the GAO analysis; the resulting centroids were normalized to 
the actual length of the associated development and production cycles and used to generate the histograms in Figure 
1.  From this preliminary analysis, the average development time centroid of cost ( ) was found to be 47% of the 
way through the development cycle, while the average production centroid ( ) was found to be 71% of the way 
through the production cycle.  The result of the production centroid analysis agrees relatively well with sarcastic but 
generally accurate cost modelling laws developed by Norm Augustine [14] that predict a value of 0.75. Equation 10 
presents the equations for present value used in this analysis. It should be noted that the overall analysis is relatively 
insensitive to the choice of centroid; either value can be varied by as much as 20% without significantly affecting 
the analysis.  This technique is intended solely to generate a preliminary result and would be unnecessary for 
situations where the year-on-year cashflows were available.   
 
 
(10) 
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Figure 2:(a) Estimated Centroid of Development Cost; (b) Estimated Centroid of Production Cost 
2.2. System Perceived Value 
A simple equation that meets all stated ground rules and assumptions for the perceived value of the system being 
acquired is shown in Equation 11. By observation it can be shown to meet the minimum unit value assumption and 
the marginal value linearity assumption.   This equation is considered to be a first-order estimate of a more complex 
and currently unknown general value expression.  With a negative marginal value constant (  it will generate a 
value region similar to that seen in Figure 1, bounded by the marginal value of production (  and the number 
of units to be acquired ( ).    
 
 (11) 
 
Using this equation as a base, the equations below show a partial derivation of the perceived present worth of the 
system.  Using the series expansions shown (and then combined into two constants  and  for convenience) an 
equation for perceived value can be developed that has the marginal value constant  as the only unknown. 
 
 
 
 
Let  
 
 
 
 (12) 
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From Equation 10, the present values of development and production can be expressed in terms of the known 
(undiscounted) cost and the appropriate mean time centroid of cost.  Incorporating this knowledge into Equation 12 
and restating the resulting expression allows the marginal change in value to be explicitly defined as shown in 
Equation 13. 
 
 (13) 
2.3. Change in value between estimates 
The equations and figures in the previous section can be restated for the current cost estimate instead of the 
baseline estimate, as shown in the equations below.  We determine the change in total value of the system by finding 
the difference between the current system value and the current values of development and production (Equation 
14). Note that in this simplified case, the baseline system value is equal to the costs associated with acquiring the 
system, allowing the second set of terms to drop out.   
 
 
 
 
 
 (14) 
 
This net present value can be used to inform a number of results; the sum of net present values of all programs 
analyzed shows the change in net present value of a significant portion of the DoD acquisitions budget.  For the 
programs analyzed, the net present value can be considered as a result in itself or as compared to the provided cost 
estimates to show the relative overrun for each project.  These analyses are presented in the results and conclusions.   
2.4. Projected change in value 
Under the NPV proportionality assumption (Equation 8), we can estimate the total change in value for each 
program over the total acquisition cycle if no programmatic adjustments are made. Equation 16 shows the factor 
applied to the current net present value to obtain the final projection.  It should be noted that the assumption made is 
entirely cost-based and does not include other factors of known importance; for this reason it is considered a first-
order estimate of the expected change in value for a given program by the end of the acquisition cycle. 
   
 (15) 
3. Results 
This analysis provides a number of potentially telling metrics associated with the DoD projects under review.  
127 unique programs were reviewed by the GAO over 10 years of study, generating 535 potential data points for 
this project. Only 291 of those potential data points (comprising 67 unique programs) provided a full set of data.  Of 
those 67 programs, ten were cancelled (approximately 15%).  The larger database contains approximately 9% 
cancelled programs. The total baseline expenditures of programs included in the analysis have a present value of 1.3 
trillion FY2012 dollars, nearly 82% of the current 2012 DoD acquisitions budget.  
 
Three preliminary value metrics are presented in this report  the projected net present value of each analyzed 
program, the aggregated daily change in net present value for all programs analyzed, and the percentage change in 
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net present value of each program compared to the baseline cost estimate. The findings section details a number of 
additional analyses that could provide both more detailed and potentially more precise information.  We use the 
projected change in value (Equation 15) as an indicator of the general health of the program  a program with an 
extremely low projected net present value is considered to be in trouble.  Positive initial net present values are 
thought to be a strong indicator of program health.  Most programs fall into a weakly negative category for which 
conclusions might not be possible. Figure 3 on the following page shows the calculated projected net present values 
for a selection of programs analysed for which strong changes in net present value are detectable.   
 
Table 2. Aggregate Results 
Aggregated Expenditures $1.293 Trillion 
Aggregated Net Present Value -$0.840 Trillion 
Aggregated Daily Change in NPV -$171.5 Million 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Projected NPV (in trillions of FY2012 dollars) 
 
Fig 4: Projected percent change in value 
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The change in net present value between the baseline and the current estimate can also be segmented into 
timesteps  the value lost in a single year or in a single day.  The budgets of analyzed programs range from $200 
million to $200 trillion.  Comparison of the net present value of these varied programs can give a skewed picture of 
comparative budget health; a $100 million overrun would be a concern for a $200 million program but may be far 
less indicative of problems in a program a hundred times larger.  Accordingly, the percentage change in value over 
that timestep is considered a preliminary indication of the relative strength of the project management; a 100% 
overrun is indicative of a problem regardless of how large that program may be.  The intent of this percentage metric 
is to mitigate the shock value of moderate overruns for extremely large programs like Joint Strike Fighter and to 
highlight overruns in small programs that could have been overlooked in the aggregate analyses. Figure 4 presents 
the percentage changes in value as described for a selection of analysed systems. 
3.1. Findings to Date 
A preliminary value analysis of Department of Defence programs considered by the Governmental 
Accountability Office in its yearly Assessment of Major Weapons Programs was performed in this report.  Using a 
limited set of publicly-available data, estimates for the present value of baseline costs for development and 
production of each program were developed and set equal to the value of the systems produced, using the concept of 
perceived value as a balancing technique.  Using the latest viable report for each program considered, this baseline 
value was used to determine a net present value given changes in estimated costs, schedule, and quantity to be 
produced.  This net present value was used to develop a number of program-specific and aggregate metrics that may 
provide insight into the current state of DoD acquisitions.   
 
The projected net present values for each analyzed program (shown in Appendix 1) shows an estimate of the 
total loss in value expected at the conclusion of each program.  These numbers are overwhelmingly negative; a solid 
majority of DoD acquisitions are shown by this analysis to be less valuable than initially presented. No programs 
with positive net present value were cancelled by the DoD, although two programs were rolled into larger efforts 
before full-rate production began.  Programs that were cancelled are not distinguishable from programs that were 
not cancelled using this technique net present value does not appear to be a clear predictor of which poorly-
performing programs will be cancelled.  Future work could include a detailed analysis of cancelled programs to seek 
value-based indicators. The aggregate daily loss in net present value for all analyzed programs was approximately 
$172 million per day for an aggregate expenditure of $1.29 trillion.  Scaling this result to the FY2012 $1.58 trillion 
acquisitions budget for the DoD yields an estimated loss of $208 million per day.   If accurate, this represents a 
significant cause for concern.  Ongoing analyses are underway to assess the specific impact of schedule slippage and 
acquisition quantity reduction.  A more detailed analysis utilizing data from DoD-sourced Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs) is planned.  
 
The percentage change of the net present value for each program provides a preliminary attempt at a normalized 
assessment of program status.  Small programs such as the APKWS (cancelled and then re-established as the 
APKWS II program) show  losses of similar normalized magnitude to large programs such as Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF); the perceived loss in value for APKWS is less than 0.01% that of the larger JSF.  There appears to be a rough 
correlation between the initial size of a program and the magnitude of the loss in net present value  large programs 
appear to have larger percentage changes.  Further investigation of this potential finding is on hold pending a 
decision to incorporate SAR data into the larger analysis.    
 
Accurate and complete reporting of programmatic data may be a concern; of 535 potential data points, only 291 
reported all information for both baseline and projected scenarios.  The degree to which these programs could 
change the results is not well understood at the present time  additional public-domain information from DoD 
SARs is currently under investigation.  Ten programs of the 127 in the GAO reports changed names over the 
acquisition lifetime; two large programs - the Future Combat System (FCS) and the Joint Tactical Radio System 
(JTRS) were split into multiple small programs, making clean accounting of development and production costs 
untenable.  Again, it is anticipated that SAR reports may make these types of changes slightly more transparent.  
Utilization of year-on-year data from the SARs will also obviate the need for time centroids of cost, potentially 
improving the accuracy of the results. 
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